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Difficulties in this area of the law would be minimized if the courts
would confine discussion of the liability of the husband for goods and
services furnished to his wife by a third party to the theories of true
agency and restitution, drawing clear-cut distinctions between the two
theories. It is only when these theories are confused through the use
of terms as agency implied in law and presumption of agency from the
fact of cohabitation that unnecessary difficulties arise. This confusion
is in semantics rather than in law.
E. MICHAEL MASINTER

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY FOR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
The federal government, to a considerable extent, waived its sovereign immunity from suit by passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
Under the Act the liability of the United States as an employer 2 is determined in accordance with the law of the state in which the negligent tortious act occurred, as it would be in a case involving a private
employer.8 Using the Federal Tort Claims Act as a model, some states
have also partially waived their sovereign immunity from suit. 4 When
the plaintiff's claim against the sovereign is based upon "liability
without fault," recovery has generally been denied, regardless of
whether the sovereign is the United States or a state and regardless of
whether the sovereign is sued in a federal or a state court. 5 In the
128 U.S.C. §§ 13 46(b), 2671-80 (1958). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1402(b), 1504,
2312(c), 2401(b), 2402, 241i(b) (1958).
2
The Act sets out numerous exceptions to its general rule of government liability for the tortious acts of its employees or agents. The more important exceptions
are those concerning discretionary functions, intentional torts, combat activities
of the military during wartime, and those arising in a foreign country. These and
the remaining exceptions are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 268o(a)-(m) (1958).
aIhe United States will be liable in money damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of the place where the
act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
'For a summary of state tort claims acts, see Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363 (1954).
5
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d
786 ( 7 th Cir. 1958); United States v. Taylor, 236 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956); United
States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64 (ist Cir. 1952); Edwards v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 885
(M.D. Ga. 1958); Bulloch v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955); Danner
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leading case of Dalehite v. United StatesG the United States Supreme
Court held that recovery under the federal Act must be based upon
misfeasance or nonfeasance since the legislative history of the Act
showed no intention to include absolute liability as a basis for recovery. Though criticized,7 the Dalehite decision has not been overruled.
Pumpherey v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co.s presents the problem of
whether a government contractor is entitled to share the immunity of
the sovereign when, without negligence, he carries out his operations
in accordance with the terms of the agreement, and the procedures
required by the contract and approved by the government result in
consequential damage9 to third parties. Defendant was engaged in
blasting operations in connection with building a lock upon the
Mississippi River. Plaintiff alleged that in the course of the work the
defendant negligently used high explosives, the concussions therefrom
injuring the plaintiff's property. Plaintiff subsequently dropped the
allegation of negligence and sought to recover solely on the basis of
strict liability.' 0 The Iowa trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff," but the Supreme Court of Iowa reversed, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not extend to cases in which liability without fault is the only basis of recovery, and that the defendant was
2
entitled to share this immunity.'
v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 477 (W.D. Mo. 1953). A search of state statutes has revealed no state which has waived its immunity from suit in the area of strict liability.
0346 U.S. 15 (1953).
T
Angoff, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A General View, 37 B.U.L. Rev. 387
(1957); Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 Stan. L. Rev.
433 (1957); Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 518 (1957)"94 N.W.2d 737 (Iowa 1959).
"neterm is applied to damage to or destruction of property not actually taken.
"Consequential damages arise when property is not actually taken or entered but
an injury to it occurs as the natural result of an act lawfully done by another."
Puloka v. Commonwealth, 323 Pa. 36, 185 Ad. 8oi, 8o3 (1936). For this and other
meanings of the term "consequential damages" see 8A Words and Phrases, Consequential Damages 222 (1951).
"1The Iowa courts are committed to the rule of absolute liability for injuries
resulting from the use of explosives, regardless of whether the injury was caused
by a direct trespass or by mere vibrations or concussions. Watson v. Mississippi
River Power Co., 174 Iowa 23, 156 N.W. 188 (1916).
"In the Lee County District Court the case was argued solely upon the liability
without fault theory.
' 2"We may at the outset eliminate the Federal Tort Claims Act...from consideration. The question is referred to considerably in the arguments, but the ultimate conclusion of both parties seems to be that it is not important here. If the
government could be sued under the Act, perhaps the defendants-contractors could
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In deciding the question of whether a government contractor is
entitled to share the sovereign's immunity, most courts have held
that a contractor who is guilty of neither negligence nor a willful tort
and who performs his work in accordance with the plans and specifications set forth in the contract is not liable for any incidental injuries
necessarily involved in the performance of the contract, and is entitled to share the immunity of the sovereign with whom he contracts.13 Thus, it has been held that a government contractor is not
liable for injuries resulting from the construction of sewers, 14 highways,' 5 drains, 16 levees, 17 bridges,' 8 harbor improvements, 9 and the
changing of a river's course.20 In denying liability a majority of courts
call him an independent contractor, though they generally treat him
as an agent, the basis of his nonliability being that he has done the
work under the complete control of the sovereign and thus is in the
some position the sovereign would have been in had it performed
the work itself.21 Others hold the contractor to be an authorized agent
of the state, and as such immune unless he has exceeded his authority,
22
or unless such authority was invalidly conferred.
However, little appears to turn on this distinction, for those courts
also be held to answer. But the Act, as its title indicates, is concerned with torts, and
does not extend to cases where the rule of 'liability without fault' is the only basis
of recovery." 94 N.W.2d at 739.
"Yeaxsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 3O9 U.S. 18 (1940); Engler v. Aldridge, 147
Kan. 43, 75 P.2d 29o (1938); Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co., 192 Minn. 18o, 256
N.W. 96 (1934); Ference v. Booth & Flinn Co., 370 Pa. 4oo, 88 A.2d 413 (1952); Glade
v. Dietert, 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642 (1956); Tidewater Constr. Corp. v. Manly,
i94 Va. 836, 75 S.E.2d 500 (s95a). See Annot., 97 A.L.R. 205 (1935), and Annot.,
69 A.L.R. 489 (1930), for general discussions of a contractor's nonliability when
under government contract.
I'Hanrahan v. Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 8o At. 312 (1911).
"Ernst v. General Refractories CO., 202 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1953).
uVictor A. Harder Realty & Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.S.2d 31o
(Sup. Ct. 1946).
"-DeBaker v. Southern California Ry., io6 Cal. 257, 39 Pac. 61o (1895).
"sWilliams v. Stillwell, 88 Ala. 332, 6 So. 914 (1889).
"Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892).
"Salliotte v. King Bridge Co., 122 Fed. 378 (6th Cir. i9o3).
2'Maezes v. City of Chicago, 316 111. App. 464, 45 N.E.2d 521 (1942); Engler v.
Aldridge, 147 Kan. 43, 75 P.2d 290 (1938); Adkins v. Harlan County, 259 Ky. 400,
82 S.W.2d 425 (1935); Daly v. Earl W. Baker & Co., 271 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1954); Val.
ley Forge Gardens Inc. v. James D. Morrissey Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 123 A.2d 888 (1956);
Wood v. Foster & Creighton Co., 191 Tenn. 478, 235 S.W.2d 1 (ig5o).
22Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 3o9 U.S. 18 (194o); Evans v. Massman
Constr. Co., 115 S.W.2d 163 (Kan. Ct. App. 1938); Tidewater Constr. Corp. v. Manly,
194 Va. 836, 75 S.E.2d 5oo (1953); Muskatell v. Queen City Constr. Co., 3 Wash. 2d
200, 1oo P.2d 380 (1940); Kaler v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging CO., 72 Wash.
497, 130 Pac. 894 (1913).
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that treat the contractor as either an independent contractor under
state control or as an authorized agent of the state generally allow
him to share the sovereign's immunity. 23 To support this position,
most courts follow two lines of reasoning. The first is concerned with
the contractor's freedom from fault,2 4 and the second points out that
the sovereign has or should have provided a suitable remedy.25 In
Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co.26 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
holding for nonliability, pointed out the contractor's freedom from
fault, stating that once he had contracted he had more than mere
authorization to proceed. The contract "puts upon him the legal duty
to do so.... Upon what basis, then, can we hold him liable in damages
for an obligation which neither legally nor morally is his, but is solely
that of the sovereign state?" 27 Furthermore, the court said, "Having
committed no wrong, defendant should not be subjected to liability.
[He] is not saved by the state's immunity from suit, but by [his] own
innocence of wrongful acts resulting in liability as for tort."28 The
second reason for granting immunity to the contractor was well stated
by the Court of Appeals of New York in Benner v. Atlantic Dredging
Co.,29 an oft-quoted case in this field. The New York court said that
since it was lawful for the sovereign to exercise its "lawful power, it
must follow that whatever results from its proper exercise is not unlawful, and if any injury, direct or consequential, results to the individual, he is remediless, except so far as the sovereign gives him
a remedy." 0 Both of these arguments were used in Yearsley v. W. A.
2'Courts that have held the contractor liable, other than on the basis of his use
of explosives, have usually done so on the ground that defendant was neither an
independent contractor under state control, nor an agent of the state. Grennell v.
Cass County, 193 Iowa 697, 187 NAV.504 (1922); Baird v. Thibodo, 197 La. 688,
7 So. 2d 388 (CL App. 1942); Wade v. Gray, 1o4 Miss. 151 , 61 So. 168 (19x3); Louden v.
City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, io6 N.E. 970 (1914).
"Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 3og U.S. 18 (194o); Nelson v. McKenzieHague Co., 192 Minn. 18o, 256 N.W. 96 (1934); Ference v. Booth & Flinn Co., 370
Pa. 400, 88 A.2d 413 (1952); Wood v. Foster & Creighton Co., 191 Tenn. 478, 235
S.W.2d 1 (1950); Glade v. Dietert, 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642 (1956); Kaler v. Puget
Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 72 Wash. 497, 13o Pac. 894 (1913).
2Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 3o9 US. 18 (194o); Maezes v. City of Chicago, 316 Ill. App. 464, 45 N.E.2d 521 (1942); Engler v. Aldridge, 147 Kan. 43, 75
P.2d 290 (1938); Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892);

Garrett v. Jones, 2oo Okla. 696, 200 P.2d 402 (1948); Tidewater Constr. Corp. v.
Manly, 194 Va. 836, 75 S.E.2d 500 (1953).
2192 Minn. 80, 256 NAV.96 (1934).
wId. at 98.
2Id. at ioo.
0134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892).
Id. at 329.
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Ross Constr. Co.,31 in which Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for
a unanimous court, said that "in the case of taking by the Government
of private property for public use ... it cannot be doubted that the
remedy to obtain compensation from the Government is as comprehensive as the requirements of the Constitution, and hence it excludes
liability of the Government's representatives lawfully acting on its
behalf in relation to the taking."8 2 In light of these two arguments,
the plaintiff is in effect told that he has brought suit against the wrong
party and that his only chance fbr recovery is to bring the proper action
against the sovereign itself.
In Pumpherey plaintiff attempted to distinguish the case at bar
from those cases which grant immunity to the contractor by asserting
that there must be a difference in theory when explosives are used.
However, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to accept this distinction,
stating that it saw "no reason for applying a different rule in explosive cases than in others."3
When explosives are the cause of injury in a case involving private
parties, there are three general views as to liability. The old view, now
rejected in most jurisdictions, was that negligence was a necessary
34
element for recovery of damages resulting from blasting operations.
A second view, followed in a minority of jurisdictions, is that no right
exists to recover for damages to adjoining property resulting from
concussions alone.35 Under this view, a defendant is liable only for a
direct trespass and not for injury caused merely by vibrations resulting from the use of explosives. The third view, which is now the
majority rule and is increasing in favor, is that one who uses explosives is absolutely liable for all injuries resulting from their use
regardless of whether the injury is caused by a direct trespass or by
36
concussions or vibrations.
81og U.S. 18 (1940).
"Id. at 22.
*394 N.W.2d at 743.

"'Bennet v. Texas-Illinois Pipeline Co., 113 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Ark. 1955).
"'Aldridge-Poage Inc. v. Parks, 297 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1956); O'Regan v. Verrochi,
325 Mass. 391, go N.E.2d 671 (195o); Whitmore v. Fago, 93 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct.
1949). The Supreme Court of Maine held that fault is a necessary requisite for recovery for damages caused by concussion or vibrations from explosives and that
in the majority of cases the rule of reasonable care will afford ample protection
under all circumstances. Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 75 A.2d 802 (Me. 195o).
For further cases discussing strict liability for explosives see Annot., 92 A.L.R. 741
(1934), and Annot., 2o A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951).

'Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Scranton v.
L. G. De Felice & Son, Inc., 137 Conn. 580, 79 A.2d 6oo (1951); Watson v. Mississippi
River Power Co., 174 Iowa 23, 156 N.W. 188 (1916); Wendt v. Yant Constr. Co., 125
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A majority of courts, unlike the Iowa court, hold that these rules
for explosives also apply to a government contractor, even though in
most cases he would be immune from suit.3 7 Thus, when the contractor's use of explosives, though authorized, is the cause of plaintiff's injury, he is placed in the same position as any other private party, and
his liability is determined by the particular jurisdiction's rule for explosives. Scranton v. L. G. De Felice & Sons, Inc.38 is a good example
of this departure by the majority of courts from the general rule
granting the gcvernment contractor immunity in cases not involving
explosives. Plaintiff's greenhouse and garage were damaged in connection with a state improvement project in which no negligence was alleged. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, stated that "under the
law of this jurisdiction one who explodes the intrinsically dangerous
substance of dynamite under such conditions that it necessarily or
obviously exposes the property of another to the damage of probable
injury is absolutely liable, irrespective of negligence on his part, even
though the damage caused is due only to ,vibrations of the earth or
concussions of the atmosphere.... The defendants were not immune
from liability for damages which resulted directly from these acts
when done in pursuance of a contract with the state." The state cannot be sued, "but the defendants are not the state and we can see no
39
reason why they should be immune."
In a jurisdiction which accepts the concussion-direct trespass distinction in regard to blasting done by private parties, the contractor
will be held liable only for injury caused by a direct trespass resulting
Neb. 277, 249 N.W. 599 (1933). "This rule rests on the principle that the explosion
of dynamite is an intrinsically dangerous operation and that, therefore, one who
engages in it acts at his peril." Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot 9- Watrous Eng'r
Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591, 593 (1951). See Restatement, Torts §§ 519, 520,
comment e (1938).
3Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927); LedbetterJohnson Co. v. Hawkins, 1o3 So. 2d 748 (Ala. 1958); Scranton v. L. G. De Felice &
Son, Inc., 137 Conn. 580, 79 A.2d 6oo (1951); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot & 'Vatrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951); Baker v. S. A. Healey Co., 302 Ill.
App. 634, 24 N.E.2d 228 (1939); Bluhm v. Blanck & Cargaro, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 451,
24 N.E.2d 615 (1939); City of Knoxville v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 34o, 87 S.V.2d
1022 (1935).
36137 Conn. 580, 79 A.2d 6oo (1951).
Old. at 6oi, 602. For examples of other cases following the rule of liability
without fault for damages from blasting, see Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry.,
19 F.gd 32 (4 th Cir. 1927); Ledbetter-Johnson Co. v. Hawkins, 103 So.9d 748 (Ala.
1958); Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 302 Ill. App. 6 34, 24 N.E.2d 228 (1939); Bluhm v.
Blanck g-Gargaro, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E.2d 615 (1939); City of Knoxville
v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 340, 87 S.W.2d 1o22 (1935).
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from the use of explosives. 40 Whitmore v. Fago4' held that the factors
freeing the contractor from liability for concussion damages rest on
the jurisdiction's rule for explosives. However, if injury is caused by
a direct trespass, the contractor will be held liable regardless of whether he would be entitled to share the sovereign's immunity in other
cases. Two Kentucky decisions clearly illustrate this distinction. 42 In
Adkins v. Harlan County43 the plaintiff sued to recover damages for
the taking of and injury to property resulting from the construction
of a highway by the state. In holding for the defendant, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that in order to recover against a contractor the injured party must prove that the damage occurred as a
result of the negligence of or a trespass by the contractor, and it is
not sufficient to show that injury resulted from the contractor's doing
the work in conformity with the plans of the highway commission.
In a later case, Aldridge-Poage Inc. v. Parks,44 in which plaintiff's land

was damaged by the construction of a water line for the city by a public contractor, the Kentucky Court of Appeals spoke only of the rule
of explosives and entirely disregarded the fact that defendant was
a public contractor. The state rule allowing the contractor to share
the immunity of its sovereign was not even considered.
Thus it can be said that two rules prevail in deciding the liability
of public contractors. First, a contractor hired to do work under a state
contract cannot be held liable to one who suffers consequential damage
as a result of non-negligent performance of this contract. Secondly,
in the majority of cases in which explosives are the cause of injury,
the rule granting immunity to the contractor is superseded by the
prevailing rule in the jurisdiction with regard to explosives. Though
directly in conflict with the majority rule regarding explosive cases,
the Pumpherey case appears to set forth a more equitable rule. It is
40Aldridge-Poage Inc. v. Parks, 297 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1956); Flynn v. Gull Constr.
Co., 183 N.YS.2d 8o6 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Whitmore v. Fago, 93 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct.
1949); Del Pizzo v. Middle West Constr. Co., 146 Pa. Super. 345, 22 A.2d 79 (1941).
'193 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
"2Other jurisdictions making this distinction are: (i) Ala., cf. Williams v. Stillwell, 88 Ala. 332, 6 So. 914 (1889), with Ledbetter-Johnson Co. v. Hawkins, io 5 So.2d
748 (Ala. 1958); (2) Ill., cf. Maezes v. City of Chicago, 316 Ill. App. 464, 45 N.E.2d 521
(1942), with Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E.2d 228 (1939); (3) N.Y.,
cf. Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1892), with
Whitmore v. Fago, 93 N.YS.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1949); (4) Pa., cf. Valley Forge Gardens
Inc. v. James D. Morrissey Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 123 A.2d 888 (1956), with Del Pizzo v.
Middle West Constr. Co., 146 Pa. Super. 345, 22 A.2d 79 (1941); (5) Tenn., cf. Wood
v. Foster & Creighton Co., 191 Tenn. 478, 235 S.W.2d 1 (1950), with City of Knoxville v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 34o, 87 S.W.2d 1022 (1935).
382 S.W.2d 425 (1935).
4297 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1956)_

